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Abstract
Recent studies on the adversarial vulnerability of neu-
ral networks have shown that models trained with the ob-
jective of minimizing an upper bound on the worst-case
loss over all possible adversarial perturbations improve ro-
bustness against adversarial attacks. Beside exploiting ad-
versarial training framework, we show that by enforcing a
Deep Neural Network (DNN) to be linear in transformed
input and feature space improves robustness significantly.
We also demonstrate that by augmenting the objective func-
tion with Local Lipschitz regularizer boost robustness of
the model further. Our method outperforms most sophisti-
cated adversarial training methods and achieves state of the
art adversarial accuracy on MNIST, CIFAR10 and SVHN
dataset. In this paper, we also propose a novel adversar-
ial image generation method by leveraging Inverse Repre-
sentation Learning and Linearity aspect of an adversarially
trained deep neural network classifier.
1. Introduction
Despite the positive outcomes of deep learning [8] in
wide ranges of computer vision tasks such as image classifi-
cation [13, 15], object detection [7, 22], semantic segmenta-
tion [11] etc., it is well known that deep neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In particular, It has been
shown that carefully designed adversarial examples, which
are inputs to machine learning models can cause the model
to make a mistake [4, 9, 16, 27]. The existence of adver-
sarial examples pose a severe security threat to the practical
deployment of deep learning models, particularly in safety
critical systems, such as autonomous driving [24], health-
care [1] etc.
Starting with the seminal work [27], there has been ex-
tensive work in the area of crafting new adversarial pertur-
bations. These work can be broadly classified in two cat-
egories: (i) finding strategies to defend against adversarial
inputs [9, 29, 18]; (ii) new attack methods that are stronger
and can break the proposed defense mechanism [18, 20].
Most adversarial defense strategies can be broken by
carefully crafted stronger adversaries as shown in [30, 2].
[18] proposed robust optimization method, which solves
this issue by finding the worst case adversarial samples on
the fly during training. Though the resulting models show
empirical proofs that they are robust against many standard
attacks, [28] observed a phenomenon, which shows [18]
does not always find the worst-case attack and it can not be
assured that a different adversary can not find adversarial
inputs that cause the model to make mistakes. This finding
initiates the desideratum to explore more efficient strategy
to enforce on the model for improving Robustness, beside
exploiting adversarial training framework as developed by
[18].
We list the main contributions of our work below :
• We design a model which progressively generalize
a linear classifier, enforced via our regularisation
method Linearity Constraint Regularization.
• Our trained model achieve state of the art adversar-
ial accuracy compared to other adversarial training
approaches which aims to improve robustness against
PGD attack on MNIST, CIFAR10 and SVHN datasets.
• We also propose a two step iterative technique for
generating adversarial image by leveraging Inverse
Representation Learning and Linearity aspect of our
adversarially trained model. We show that our pro-
posed adversarial image generation method is well
generalized and can act as adversary to other deep neu-
ral network classifiers also.
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly discuss about adversarial at-
tack problem formulation in classification framework and
then describe Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [18] ad-
versarial attack which we use as a baseline in our paper.
The goal of an adversarial attack is to find out minimum
perturbation δ in the input space x (i.e. input pixels for an
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image) that results in the change of class prediction by the
network ψ. Mathematically, we can write this as follows:
argmin
δ
||δ||p-norm s.t ψk(x+ δ; θ) ≥ ψk′(x; θ)
Here, ψk′ and ψk represents the classifier output component
corresponding to the true class and any other class except
the true class respectively. θ denotes the parameters of the
classifier ψ. Input and output are represented as x and y
respectively and the objective function as J(θ, x, y).
The magnitude of adversarial perturbation is constrained
by a p-norm where p-norm ∈ {0, 2,∞} to ensure that the
adversarially perturbed example xadv is close to the original
sample. Below, we pose this as an optimization problem:
xadv = argmax
x′
J(θ, x′, y) s.t.||x′ − x||p-norm <  (1)
Projected Gradient Descent [18] is an iterative method to
generate perturbed output using Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [9] confined to bounded perturbation space S and
can be formulated as follows:
xi+1 = Projx+S (x
i + α sgn (∇xJ(θ, xi, y))) (2)
Here xi represents perturbed sample at i-th iteration.
In general, there are mainly two types of adversarial at-
tacks, white box and black box attacks. In white box attack,
adversary has complete knowledge of the network and its
parameters. While in Black box attack there is no infor-
mation available about network architecture or parameters.
Numerous works have been proposed to defend against such
adversarial attacks. [3, 17, 10, 5, 21, 32, 25] showed dif-
ferent defense strategies to improve the robustness of deep
neural networks. Unfortunately, [2] find that all these de-
fense policies use obfuscated gradients, a kind of gradi-
ent masking, that leads to false sense of security in de-
fense against adversarial examples and provides a limited
improvement in robustness. [2] also observes Adversarial
training is the only defense which significantly increases ro-
bustness to adversarial examples within the threat model.
Hence, we focus on adversarial training framework
which allows to defend against adversarial attack by train-
ing neural networks on adversarial images that are gener-
ated on-the-fly during training. Adversarial training con-
stitutes the current state of the art in adversarial robustness
against white-box attacks. In this work we aim to improve
model robustness further by leveraging adversarial training
framework.
[33] proposed a network architecture (termed as FDT)
that comprises of denoising blocks at the intermediate hid-
den layers which aims to remove noise from the features in
latent layers introduced due to adversarial perturbation, in
turn increases the adversarial robustness of the model. [23]
observes that latent layers of an adversarially trained model
is not robust and proposed a technique to perform adversar-
ial training of latent layer (termed as LAT) in conjunction
with adversarial training of the full network which aims at
increasing the adversarial robustness of the model. In this
paper we have shown improvements in adversarial accuracy
as well as clean accuracy over these aforementioned meth-
ods.
3. Neural Network Architecture and Training
Objective Function
In this section, we briefly discuss our proposed network
architecture and training objective. As depicted in Fig. 1 ,
our network architecture consists of two separate branches:
Concept and Significance branch. Concept branch consists
of series of stacked residual convolution block of ResNet18
[12] architecture along with global average pooling and two
parallel components: fully connected layer and series of up-
Convolution layers. Significance branch consists of series
of stacked residual convolution block of ResNet18 [12] ar-
chitecture along with global average pooling and fully con-
nected combined with reshape layer.
x0 is fed as input to Concept branch to output “Con-
cept Vector” C(x) from fully connected layer and recon-
structed image xrecons from series of up-convolution layer.
x0 is also fed as input to Significance branch to produce
“Class Significance Matrix” G(x), a 2-Dimensional Matrix
as output. Finally, we multiply “Concept Vector”C(x) with
“Class Significance Matrix” G(x), which forms the logit
vector l(x) and apply the softmax function to produce class
probabilities of the classifier ψ.
Let’s assume, Concept branch of our network is defined
by a sequence of transformations hk for each of its K lay-
ers. For an input x0 (which we represent as C0), we can
formulate the operation performed by the Concept branch
of our architecture as below:
CK = hk(Ck−1) for k = 1, ...,K (3)
Here “Concept Vector” CK ∈ RM , where M represents
the number of different concepts, we want to capture from
underlying data distribution.
Similarly we assume, Significance branch of the network
is defined by a sequence of transformations fk for each of
its K layers. We can formulate the operation performed by
the Significance branch of our architecture with same input
x0 (which we represent as G0) as below:
GK = fk(Gk−1) for k = 1, ...,K (4)
Here “Class Significance Matrix” GK ∈ RM∗N , where, N
and M represents number of classes and concepts respec-
tively.
We define logit vector l as product of Concept vectorCK
and Class Significance Matrix GK . We formulate the logit
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Figure 1. Network Architecture of our proposed neural network classifier LiCS Net.
vector l and output of classifier ψ as follows:
l(x, θ) = CK(x, θ) ·GK(x, θ) (5)
ψ(x, θ) = Softmax (l(x, θ)) (6)
We term the above proposed network architecture as
Linearised Concept Significance Net denoted as LiCS
Net. In the next section, We shed lights to explain linear
aspect in our classifier.
We also propose a training objective termed as Lips-
chitz and Linearity Constrained Objective Function as
ObjL2C. It comprises of four different components : (a)
Cross-Entropy Loss for Classification, denoted as LCE , (b)
Linearity Constraint Regularization loss, which is denoted
as LLC , (c) Local Lipschitz Regularizer for Concept Vector
and Class Significance Matrix, which is denoted asLLR and
(d) Reconstruction error, which is represented as LRE . Our
training objective ObjL2C can be formulated as follows:
ObjL2C(x, xadv, θ, y) = α · LCE + β · LLC
+ γ · LLR + λ · LRE (7)
Here α, β, γ and λ are the regularizer coefficient corre-
sponding to different component of our objective function.
We briefly discuss about different component of the ob-
jective function.
(a) Cross-Entropy loss is defined as follows:
LCE =
N∑
c=1
(ytrue · log(ypred))
where ypred = ψ(xadv, θ)
(8)
Here c represents class index, N denotes number of classes,
ytrue holds ground-truth class label score. ypred hold class
probability scores when an adversarial image xadv is being
fed through the classifier.
For the remainder of this section, xadv refers to the gen-
erated adversarial image from its corresponding true image
x by following eq. 2. Note that ground-truth label is same
for both xadv and x.
(b) Linearity Constraint Regularization loss is defined
as follows:
LLC =
∥∥∥∥ ∂l(xadv, θ)∂CK(xadv, θ) − GK(xadv, θ)
∥∥∥∥
2
(9)
Here || . ||2 represents the l2-norm of a given vector. We
are enforcing the logit vector l(xadv, θ) to behave as a linear
classifier with “Concept Vector”CK as the input and “Class
Significance Matrix” GK as the parameters or weights of
that linear classifier.
Intuitively, a linear classifier can be defined as
L(x,W ) = WT · x, where x is input and W captures sig-
nificance of each input features for the classification task.
Comparing eq. 5 with linear classifier L, we hypothesize
CK encodes the transformed input features like x and GK
encodes the significance weight factor for concept features
same as W .
(c) Local Lipschitz Regularizer for Concept Vector
and Class Significance Matrix is defined based on the con-
cept of “Lipschitz constant”. Let’s assume a function φ(x)
having Lipschitz Constant value of LΦ. Below equation
3
holds true for all ∆.
‖φ(x+ ∆) − φ(x)‖ ≤ LΦ · ‖∆‖ (10)
Hence, we argue that a lower Lipschitz constant ensures
that the functions output for its corresponding perturbed in-
put is not significantly different and it can be used to im-
prove the adversarial robustness of a classifier.
The Lipschitz constant of our network ψ has an upper
bound defined by the product of Lipschitz constant of its
sub-networks: Concept and Significance branch. We can
formulate this as follows:
Lψ ≤ LsubC · LsubG (11)
Here LsubC and LsubG are the Lipschitz constant of the sub
network Concept branch and Significance branch respec-
tively.
To achieve a robust classifier, we aim to improve robust-
ness of its sub-networks using Local Lipschitz Regularizer
for Concept Vector and Class Significance Matrix, which is
formulated as follows:
LLR = β1 · ||CK(x, θ)− CK(xadv, θ)||2
+β2 · ||GK(x, θ)−GK(xadv, θ)||2
(12)
Here, CK(x, θ) and GK(x, θ) are Concept vector and
Class Significance Matrix respectively when a true image
is passed through our network. Similarly, CK(xadv, θ)
andGK(xadv, θ) are Concept vector and Class Significance
Matrix respectively when the corresponding adversarial im-
age is passed through the network. β1 and β2 are the regu-
larization coefficients.
Note that, we enforce invariability of Concept vectorCK
and Class Significance matrix GK to the model for an orig-
inal image x and its corresponding adversarial image xadv
through Local Lipschitz Regularizer.
(d) Reconstruction error is defined as follows:
LRE = ||x − xrecons||2 (13)
where x is the input image and xrecons is the reconstructed
image at last up-convolution layer of the Concept branch of
our network.
4. Adversarial Image Generation
In this section, we propose adversarial image generation
method which consists of two iterative steps stated as fol-
lows: (i) Find minimum perturbation of Concept Vector
C(x, θ) which guarantees to fool the classifier by exploit-
ing “linearity” aspect of the classifier. (ii) Using the per-
turbed concept vector from step (i), generate an equivalent
perturbation in image space (i.e. image pixels) by leverag-
ing inverse representation which fools the classifier.
We elaborate above steps of adversarial image genera-
tion method below:
Step (i): We represent the i-th component of logit vector
defined in eq. 5 as:
li(x, θ) = CK(x, θ) · GiK(x, θ) (14)
Here GiK(x, θ) is the i-th column of Class Significance Ma-
trix which encodes the significance weight factor of con-
cepts for the i-th class.
Let 's assume for a given image x0, the network produces
a Concept VectorCK , and the ground truth class label corre-
sponding to image x0 is i˜. Now, the minimum perturbation
(δ) required in Concept Vector to fool the classifier can be
formulated as follows:
argmin
δ
||δ||2 s.t.
(CK0(x0, θ) + δ) ·GiK(x0, θ) ≥ (CK0(x0, θ) + δ)
·Gi˜K(x0, θ)
In the above relation, “i” represents the class index and
i 6= i˜ must satisfy. Now, we can re-arrange and write above
equation as follows:
δ ≤ CK(x0, θ) · (G
i
K(x0, θ)−Gi˜K(x0, θ))
Gi˜K(x0, θ)−GiK(x0, θ)
(15)
Using eq. 5 into eq. 15, we write this as follows:
δ ≤ l
i(x0, θ)− li˜(x0, θ)
Gi˜K(x0, θ)−GiK(x0, θ)
(16)
As shown in Fig. 2, Concept vector is represented as a
point in M dimensional concept space. We decide to per-
turb the Concept vector CK(x0, θ) towards the linear deci-
sion boundary of a target class it, which satisfy the follow-
ing relation:
it = argmin
i 6=i˜
|li(x0, θ)− li˜(x0, θ)|
||Gi˜K(x0, θ)−GiK(x0, θ)||2
(17)
Here, it is the target class index, which has the decision
boundary nearest to the Concept vector CK(x0, θ) com-
pared to decision boundary of any other class in terms of
|| . ||2 norm.
We then shift the Concept vector CK(x0, θ) in the direc-
tion normal to the it linear decision boundary surface. As
shown in Fig. 2, the movement of Concept vector is repre-
sented by a red arrow and the linear decision boundary of
the target class it is depicted asBt. Mathematically, we rep-
resent the direction of the optimal shift (δ∗) of the concept
vector CK(x0, θ) as follows:
δ∗ =
|lit(x0, θ)− li˜(x0, θ)
||GitK(x0, θ)−Gi˜K(x0, θ)||22
· (∇(lit)−∇(li˜)) (18)
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Hence, we obtain a new perturbed concept vector
CnewK (x0, θ), by adding the optimal shift to the actual value
of concept vector CK(x0, θ). We represents this as follows:
CnewK (x0, θ) = CK(x0, θ) + δ
∗ (19)
We perform this whole process iteratively, until the per-
turbed concept vector change the classifier’s true predic-
tion. We denote the final perturbed concept vector as
CperturbK (x0, θ) which obeys below condition:
CperturbK0 (x0, θ) ·GiK(x0, θ) ≥ CK0(x0, θ) ·Gi˜K(x0, θ)
such that i 6= i˜
(20)
Figure 2. depicts the optimal shift of Concept Vector towards the
normal direction of the nearest class decision boundary plane in
order to change the classifier prediction.
Step (ii) : From step (i), we obtain a final perturbed
concept vector CperturbK (x0, θ) which guarantees to change
the classifier’s prediction. Now the main question is
“How do we generate the adversarial image (xperturbadv )
which corresponds to the final Perturbed Concept vector
CperturbK (x0, θ)?”.
As illustrated in [6], the Representation vector of a given
input x are the activations of the penultimate layer of the
network. [6] also illustrate that adversarially trained model
produces similar Representation vectors for semantically
similar images. For a given input, Concept vector gener-
ated from the Concept branch of our network LiCS Net is
analogous to Representation vector.
We have used “Inverse Representation” [19, 31, 6]
method to generate adversarial image xperturbadv which
corresponds to the final Perturbed Concept vector
CperturbK (x0, θ), starting from the true input image x0 and
its corresponding Concept vector CK(x0, θ). We can pose
this method as an optimization problem detailed in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code of Step (ii)
Input: True Image x0, Perturbed Concept Vector
CperturbK (x0, θ), LiCS Net Classifier ψLiCS
Output: Adversarial Image xperturbadv
1 Initialise xadv = x0
2 Set CtargetK = C
perturb
K (x0, θ)
3 while
argmax ψLiCS(xadv, θ) 6= argmax ψLiCS(x0, θ)
do
(i) xadv = xadv −∇xadv ||CtargetK − CK(xadv, θ)||
(ii) if ‖xadv − x0‖2-norm ≥ 
then, xadv = Projx0+S(xadv)
4 Adversarial Image, xperturbadv = xadv
We term above proposed algorithm as Adversarial Im-
age Generation using Linearity and Inverse Representa-
tion as AIGLiIR.
In Fig. 3, we depicted few adversarial images generated
by our proposed method AIGLiIR. Such adversarial im-
age guarantees to fool white box threat model. For exam-
ple, in the case of CIFAR10, generated adversarial images
by AIGLiIR method are being classified by our proposed
LiCS Net as Bird and Deer whereas its corresponding true
level are Airplane and Horse.
Moreover with evident results provided in next section,
we claim that our adversarial image generation method
AIGLiIR is very effective in fooling various deep neural
network designed for classification task.
We infer most deep neural network classifier consists of
series of feature extraction layers or convolutional layers
followed by one or more fully connected layers. Hence,
we represents such deep neural network classifier Ψ as:
Ψ(x, θ) = g(f(x)). Here, f(x) act as the transformation
applied on input by sub network of Ψ which comprises of
all the layers upto penultimate layer and g act as the signif-
icance factor applied by last fully connected layer, to each
transformed features from f(x).
We observe that f and g are analogous to Concept vector
and Significance Matrix of our network LiCS Net such that
Concept vector encodes the transformed features of input
image and Significance Matrix captures significance weight
factor for each concept features. We argue that our clas-
sifier LiCS Net is linear on its transformed input features.
Hence we can also apply our adversarial image generation
AIGLiIR to other classification network.
5. Experiments and Results
In this section, we briefly discuss our experimental find-
ings to analyze the robustness of our proposed network
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Figure 3. depicts few sample pairs of source image and its corresponding adversarial image generated by our proposed AIGLiIR method.
LiCS Net. We have performed experiment to show the
“Transferability” of the adversarial images generated by our
method AIGLiIR. We also discuss findings on the effective-
ness of Linearity Constraint and Local Lipschitz Regular-
izer in our objective function ObjL2C to improve adversar-
ial robustness. The samples are constructed using PGD ad-
versarial perturbations as proposed in [18] for adversarial
training. For the remainder of this section, we refer an ad-
versarially trained model as a model which is trained us-
ing PGD adversarial examples [18]. Clean and Adversar-
ial accuracy are defined as a accuracy of a network over
original images and over the adversarial images generated
from the test dataset respectively. Higher adversarial ac-
curacy implies more robust network. To test the efficacy
of our proposed training method, we perform experiments
over CIFAR10, SVHN and MNIST dataset. For fairness, we
compare our method against three different fine-tuned tech-
niques applied in adversarial training framework. These are
Adversarial Training (AT) [18], Feature Denoising Training
(FDT) [33] and Latent adversarial Training( (LAT) [23].
5.1. Evaluation using Adversarial Accuracy
We train LiCS Net using ObjL2C training objective and
denote this as Concept-Significance Adversarial Training
(CSAT). In order to compare Concept-Significance Adver-
sarial Training (CSAT) with other fine tuned adversarial
techniques we use PGD adversarial perturbation.
PGD configuration : The configuration of PGD adver-
sarial perturbation varies for different datasets. For MNIST
dataset, we restrict the maximum amount of per pixel per-
turbation as 0.3 (in the pixel scale of 0 to 1 range) and we
choose 40 steps of PGD iterations with step size of 2/255.
For CIFAR10 and SVHN dataset, we restrict the maximum
amount of per pixel perturbation as 8.0 (in the pixel scale of
0 to 255 range) and we choose 10 steps of PGD iterations
with step size of 2/255.
Concept-Significance Adversarial Training(CSAT) vs
others : Table 1 reports the adversarial accuracy compari-
son between our proposed technique Concept-Significance
Adversarial Training (CSAT) and other fine tuned ad-
versarial training techniques such as Adversarial Train-
ing (AT), Feature Denoising Training (FDT), Latent ad-
versarial Training(LAT) over different datasets. Concept-
Significance Adversarial Training (CSAT) outperforms all
the other fine tuned adversarial training strategies such as
AT, FDT, LAT and achieves state of the art adversarial ac-
curacy on various datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR10 and
SVHN.
Concept-Significance Adversarial Training (CSAT)
achieves adversarial accuracy of 54.77%, 60.41% and
98.68% on CIFAR10, SVHN and MNIST dataset respec-
tively. Note that in AT, FDT and LAT, fine tuning strategies
are being performed over Wide ResNet based (WRN 32-10
wide) architecture [34] in the case of CIFAR10 and SVHN
dataset. We use the same network configuration for all
the different datasets. Note that we choose dimension of
concept vector as 10 and the dimension of class signifi-
cance matrix as 10×10. To train our model we use adam
optimizer [14] with the learning rate of 0.0002.
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Dataset Adversarial
Training
Techniques
Adversarial
Accuracy
Clean
Accuracy
CIFAR10
AT 47.12% 87.27%
FDT 46.99% 87.31%
LAT 53.84% 87.80%
CSAT 54.77% 87.65%
SVHN
AT 54.58% 91.88%
FDT 54.69% 92.45%
LAT 60.23% 91.65%
CSAT 61.37% 95.11%
MNIST
AT 93.75% 98.40%
FDT 93.59% 98.28%
LAT 94.21% 98.38%
CSAT 98.68% 99.46%
Table 1. Comparison of Adversarial accuracy and Clean accuracy
for CIFAR10, SVHN and MNIST datasets acheieved by different
adversarial training techniques
5.2. Transferability of Generated Adversarial Samples
Training on adversarial samples has been shown as one
of the best method to improve robustness of a classifier
[18, 29, 23]. We denote AIGCSPGD as the adversarial im-
age generation method to generate adversarial samples us-
ing PGD adversarial perturbations [18] on our trained net-
work LiCS Net using our objective function ObjL2C . In
previous section, we proposed our adversarial image gen-
eration method AIGLiIR to generate adversarial samples
using our trained network LiCS Net.
We evaluate adversarial accuracy of different standard
pre-trained models such as GoogleNet [26] (trained on CI-
FAR10), ResNet34 [12] (trained on SVHN) and custom
Net-3FC (trained on MNIST) on adversarial samples gen-
erated using AIGLiIR and AIGCSPGD method and com-
pare with their respective clean test accuracy. Note that cus-
tom Net-3FC consists of 3 fully connected layers along with
Relu activation and softmax function.
AIGLiIR vs AIGCSPGD : As evident in Fig. 4, For
classifiers GoogleNet, ResNet34 and custom Net-3FC, we
observe significant drop in accuracy on adversarial sam-
ples generated using AIGCSPGD and AIGLiIR method,
in comparison to their clean accuracy. For example in
case of ResNet34, drop in accuracy on adversarial sam-
ples generated usingAIGLiIR method is 18.34% more than
drop in accuracy on adversarial samples generated using
AIGCSPGD in comparison with clean accuracy on SVHN
dataset. Similary in case of GoogleNet, drop in accuracy
on adversarial samples generated usingAIGLiIR method is
40.82% more than drop in accuracy on adversarial samples
generated using AIGCSPGD, in comparison with clean ac-
curacy on CIFAR10 dataset.
Figure 4. depicts the comparison between clean accuracy
and adversarial accuracy evaluated on samples generated by
AIGCSPGD and AIGLiLR method.
These experimental finding suggests adversarial samples
generated using AIGLiIR act as a better adversary to var-
ious network architectures such as GoogleNet, Resnet34
and custom Net-3FC which shows the “transferability” of
these adversarial samples. Our adversarial image genera-
tion methodAIGLiIR can also be used for black box attack
to other classification networks due to its robustness and
transferability.
In Fig. 5, we depict few adversarial samples generated
byAIGCSPGD method using the original test set images of
the MNIST, CIFAR10 and SVHN datasets. These generated
samples fooled standard pre-trained networks such as cus-
tom Net-3FC, GoogleNet and ResNet34. But our proposed
model LiCS Net, trained using our proposed objective func-
tionObjL2C as described in eq. 7 correctly predicts the true
class of these generated adversarial samples.
5.3. Ablation Study
Architecture : We have used our proposed network
LiCS Net for ablation experiments on our objective func-
tion as stated in eq. 7. We kept all the hyperparameters
same for different experiments of ablation study. We evalu-
ated adversarial accuracy of our network LiCS Net trained
with base objective function (termed as ObjBASE) which
consists of cross-entropy and reconstruction loss and used
it as our baseline adversarial accuracy for ablation study.
Linearity Constraint vs Local Lipschitz Regular-
izer : As evident from Table 2, adversarial accuracy
improves in both the cases when base training objec-
tive is augmented with Linearity Constraint Regularizer
(termed as ObjBASE+LCR) and also when ObjBASE is
augmented with Local Lipschitz Regularizer (termed as
ObjBASE+LLR) compared to the baseline adversarial accu-
racy. Experimental findings suggests that the regularisation
impact of Linearity Constraint is much more effective com-
pared to Local Lipschitz Regularisation to improve model
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Figure 5. depicts few samples of adversarial image generated by
AIGCSPGD method, which can fool standard classifiers such as
GoogleNet, ResNet34 and custom Net-3FC trained respectively
on CIFAR10, SVHN and MNIST datasets but LiCS Net predicts
the class correctly for all these adversarial images.
robustness. Note that we achieve state of the art adversarial
accuracy when ObjBASE is augmented with both Linearity
Constraint and Local Lipschitz Regulariser.
Training Obj. Adv. AccuracyCIFAR10 SVHN MNIST
ObjBASE 47.02% 54.17% 93.14%
ObjBASE+LLR 49.75% 55.70% 95.39%
ObjBASE+LCR 54.39% 60.61% 98.06%
ObjL2C 54.77% 61.37% 98.68%
Table 2. depicts adversarial accuracy comparison of our model
LiCS Net trained using different objective functions on various
datasets
6. Conclusion
We observe that adversarial training method is the de-
facto method to improve model robustness. We propose the
model LiCS Net which achieves state of the art adversarial
accuracy trained with our proposed objective function on
the MNIST, CIFAR10 and SVHN datasets along with the
improvement in normal accuracy. We also propose an Ad-
versarial Image Generation method AIGLiIR that exploits
Linearity Constraint and Inverse Representation learning to
construct adversarial examples. We performed several ex-
periments to exhibit the robustness and transferability of
the adversarial samples generated by our Adversarial Image
Generation method across different networks. We demon-
strate that the model trained with Linearity Constrained
Regularizer in the adversarial training framework boost ad-
versarial robustness. Through our research, we shed lights
on the impact of linearity on robustness. We hope, our find-
ings will inspire discovery of new adversarial defenses and
attacks and, offers a significant pathway for new develop-
ments in adversarial machine learning.
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